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Is the Mentaculus the Best System of Our World? 
 
Meir Hemmo†, Orly Shenker‡ 
Abstract 
Barry Loewer and David Albert put forward a theory that they call “The Mentaculus”, which they 
claim to be “arguably a complete scientific theory of the universe”. Albert and Loewer’s 
Mentaculus is an expanded version of their version of statistical mechanics. On their view - as 
recently updated by Loewer’s “Package Deal Approach” - The Mentaculus is the “best system” 
of our world in the Lewis-style sense of this term: it contains a partial description of the 
fundamental reality (“The Humean base”) and provides the optimal balance between 
informativeness and simplicity. The Mentaculus has other advantages, in particular, it is 
reductionist in the sense that it unifies all the sciences, and it is physicalist in the sense that the 
account of everything is ultimately based on physics. In this paper we examine the extent to which 
The Mentaculus is reductionist and physicalist. We compare it with “Flat Physicalism”, which is 
our version of expanded statistical mechanics, that is a reductive type-type physicalist identity 
theory of everything that there is. The Mentaculus is less reductionist than Flat Physicalism, since 
whereas both theories assume the fundamental microdynamics and suitable contingent facts, The 
Mentaculus assumes the Past Hypothesis and a Statistical Postulate, that Flat Physicalism derives 
from the microdynamics and the contingent facts. Additionally, Flat Physicalism derives from the 
latter all the special sciences kinds and laws, while The Mentaculus does not contain any 
explanatory account of such reduction. Therefore, Flat Physicalism is arguably “better” than The 
Mentaculus in the “best system” sense of the term. 
1. The Mentaculus 
Barry Loewer and David Albert put forward an “outrageously ambitious” theory that they call 
“The Mentaculus”, which they claim to be “arguably a complete scientific theory of the universe” 
(Loewer 2020a).  
 
“The Mentaculus is a probability map of the universe in that it determines a probability 
density over the set of physically possible trajectories of microstates emanating from M(0), 
and thereby probabilities over all physically specifiable macro histories. Once the 
dynamical laws are specified, The Mentaculus contains an answer to every question of the 
form “What is the objective probability of B given A?” for all physically specifiable 
propositions A and B. For example, it specifies the probability that an ice cube will 
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completely melt in the next five minutes given a description of the macrostate of its 
environment, and the probability that Trump will be impeached given the current 
macrostate of the universe.” (Loewer 2020a, p. 6)  
 
A central motivation of Loewer and Albert for endorsing The Mentaculus is that they think it forms 
the “best system”, in the Lewis-style sense of this term: it is a partial description of the fundamental 
reality (“The Humean base”, discussed below) which provides the optimal balance between 
informativeness and simplicity. It seems that on their view this “best system” has also other 
advantages, in particular, it is reductive in the sense that it unifies all the sciences, and physicalist 
in the sense that the account of everything is ultimately based on physics.  
 
In this paper we show that The Mentaculus is not the “best system” since a “better” theory is 
possible and available: our “Flat Physicalism” theory, described in Section 2, which is more 
reductive and more physicalist than The Mentaculus, and therefore offers a better balance of 
simplicity and informativeness. The Mentaculus can be improved along its lines, in a way that is 
compatible with Loewer’s Package Deal Approach (2020b), but in this case the distinction 
between the Humean framework and reductive physicalism becomes less clear. We compare the 
two theories in Sections 3 and 4.  
 
The Mentaculus is essentially a version of statistical mechanics, expanded and augmented so as to 
account for all the phenomena. “Statistical mechanics” was originally the name of the (ongoing, 
unfinished) project of accounting for the facts described by thermodynamics, on the basis of the 
fundamental theories of physics together with some auxiliary hypotheses. Various theories share 
this name as well as this aim, but differ in the details of how to achieve it.1 Here is Albert and 
Loewer’s theory of statistical mechanics, which is at the heart of The Mentaculus: 
 
“The Newtonian statistical-mechanical contraption for making inferences about the world 
consists, in its entirety, of three laws and one contingent empirical fact. The empirical fact 
is the one about what the macrocondition of the world currently happens to be (or rather, 
the empirical fact is the one about what the directly surveyable condition of the world 
currently happens to be; where the directly surveyable condition of the world - insofar as 
Mr. X is concerned - includes its macrocondition plus whatever, perhaps microscopic, 
features of Mr. X’s brain he may happen to have direct and unproblematic introspective 
access to)2, and the laws are:                                                                        
1. The Newtonian law of motion (which is that F = ma). 
 
1 The standard ones are described in (Frigg 2008).  
2 Since here “introspection” must be a measurement of a system by itself (not one part of the system 
measuring another part, but one and the same part measuring itself), we are not sure that this can be part 
of a physicalist account of the universe. This detail of The Mentaculus can be amended by opting for a 
type-type reductive account of the mental, as in Flat Physicalism, described in Section 2. 
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2. The Past-Hypothesis (which is that the world first came into being in whatever particular 
low-entropy highly condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the normal 
inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present to us). 
3. The Statistical Postulate (which is that the right probability-distribution to use for 
making inferences about the past and the future is the one that’s uniform, on the standard 
measure, over those regions of phase space which are compatible with whatever other 
information - either in the form of laws or in the form of contingent empirical facts - we 
happen to have).” (Albert 2000, p. 96) 
 
(For brevity, we use the following acronyms: NM for Newtonian mechanics, CF for the contingent 
fact, PH for the past hypothesis, SP for the statistical postulate. We stress that CF is - as Albert 
writes - what the macroscopic condition of the world currently happens to be, as is surveyable by 
a given observer, and includes this observer’s brain state which is3 this observer’s perceptions and 
memories.)  
 
We will argue that our Flat Physicalism is “better” than The Mentaculus in that it retains the same 
degree of informativeness, but is simpler. In this paper as a working hypothesis, we adopt the 
Humean framework of the Lewis-Loewer-Albert best system approach to laws (as in Loewer 
2020b; Albert 2014; see Sec. 3 for a detailed discussion of this framework). Famously, there are 
various ideas about what simplicity is, which lead to different “measures of simplicity”.  Here we 
shall not dwell on this notion, because we will show that Albert and Lower assume (implicitly or 
explicitly) all the laws and facts that we assume, namely CF+NM, but add some other laws, namely 
the PH+SP.4 It seems to us that Albert and Loewer can arrive at their additional laws either in our 
way, namely by deriving PH+SP from CF+NM (see below, what we mean by “deriving” here), in 
which case their Mentaculus will be improved in the sense that it will simpler.; or they must 
commit themselves to an extra source of information concerning these additional laws, and this 
extra source will make their system much more complex. By “derivation” of PH+SP from CF+NM 
we allow various kinds of inductive inferences from CF. We describe the derivation of SP in Sec. 
2.3, and of PH in sec. 2.4. 
 
The system we call Flat Physicalism holds that all there is to the world is its actual microscopic 
trajectory as given by the specific equation of motion of the physical theory (quantum or classical, 
which includes all the parameters and boundary or initial conditions). In a Humean framework we 
take the micro-trajectory to be the full Humean base, where the laws of physics are supposed to 
give a partial simple and informative description of this base. It seems to us that this is also Albert 
and Loewer’s view5 (we discuss their Humean view in Sec. 3). Everything that is true about the 
world should be derived (see below) from facts we know to be true about the micro-trajectory and 
 
3 Or on which supervenes; we don’t address this difference here. 
4 We thank Barry Loewer and David Albert for discussions about this and other points in this paper. 
5 Personal communication. 
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nothing else. That is, Flat Physicalism assumes NM and CF only, and we will show that it can 
derive from them PH (if it is true; see Hemmo and Shenker 2012 Ch. 10 and 2019a) and SP (if it 
is true; see Hemmo and Shenker 2019b and below). This version of statistical mechanics is part of 
a reductive type-identity physicalist theory (see Hemmo and Shenker 2019a, 2019b, 2020, Shenker 
2017a, which builds on Hemmo and Shenker 2012, 2016, Shenker 2017b,c, 2020).  
 
In order to be “arguably a complete scientific theory of the universe”, both systems, Flat 
Physicalism and The Mentaculus, must account not only for thermodynamics but also for all the 
(other) so-called special sciences. According to Flat Physicalism, since all there is to the world is 
the full micro-trajectory, Laplace’s demon who knows the actual trajectory ipso facto knows all 
the special sciences laws and facts. However, in contemporary literature, most authors with 
physicalist inclination endorse so-called “non-reductive physicalism”, that is: a view that allows 
for “multiple realizability” of special sciences kinds by physical kinds. Only a minority of thinkers 
endorse “reductive physicalism” and do not accept multiple realizability. Flat Physicalism is a full-
fledged reductive type-identity theory, and therefore it rejects multiple realizability (and multiple 
realization, of course). We are not sure about Albert’s and Loewer’s current views on this matter: 
if they accept “multiple realizability” (as Lewis did), their metaphysics is not physicalist, but 
dualist. We will argue for this claim as we proceed and present what we take to be their views on 
this matter in Section 4.  
 
A dualist metaphysics might be the “best system”, but still it is of interest to know that this is the 
view endorsed. If so, we shall argue that Flat Physicalism is “better” in this context too, since it is 
physicalist, and moreover it accounts for the special sciences on the basis of CF+NM alone, thus 
retaining the informativeness of The Mentaculus in a simpler way.  
 
In the above description of The Mentaculus (as well as in Flat Physicalism as we discuss it here), 
classical mechanics plays the role of fundamental physics. Of course, according to contemporary 
physics classical mechanics is false. Still, it is useful to consider statistical mechanics in the 
classical context because arguably the classical theory preserves some of the salient explanatory 
and predictive aspects of the true fundamental physics, under the appropriate relevant conditions6 
(see Wallace 2001, Sec. 1; Ladyman and Ross 2007, Ch. 1, for a critical discussion of the use of 
outdated physics in philosophical discussions; see Shenker 2020 on the foundations of quantum 
statistical mechanics). 
 
Let us describe already here what we take to be the crucial points of disagreement between Flat 
Physicalism and The Mentaculus approaches.  
 
 
6 In this paper we do not address Hempel’s Dilemma concerning what is the physics that ought to be 
taken as fundamental in a reductionist project; see (Firt, Hemmo, and Shenker 2020). 
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Both Flat Physicalism and The Mentaculus agree (we think) that we have available to us, as 
empirical data, the observations CF as described above: the macroscopic condition of the world as 
it is given to an observer. The two theories differ on the following. 
 
Flat Physicalism takes CF as a starting point, although it is open to the possibility that its contents 
is false.7 Suppose first that CF is by and large true: what is it true of? The answer to this question 
should be given by a theory about the world, which provides an explanation for CF. One good 
candidate for an explanation of CF is that the world is as described by NM. (In Flat Physicalism 
as well as - we think - in the The Mentaculus PDA approach, NM is a placeholder for our best 
contemporary theories of physics.8) In particular, this means that the best explanation of CF is that 
everything that there is in the world is its micro-trajectory in the sense of NM, of which CF+NM 
provide a partial description (CF provides only some of the parameters and initial and boundary 
conditions that are needed to provide a well-defined micro-trajectory, and therefore it is compatible 
with a set of such trajectories, only one of which is the actual one). According to Flat Physicalism, 
given CF+NM we can derive PH and SP (as described in Section 2 below), since both PH and SP 
are partial descriptions of the actual micro-trajectory, that are more partial (and therefore 
compatible with) the partial description provided by CF+NM. PH is understood here as some 
macroscopic description of the state of the world at some past moment, and is in this sense on a 
par with the contents of CF (but contains less information than CF+NM); and SP is understood as 
expressing relative frequencies along the actual micro trajectory of the universe (and not as 
pertaining to counterfactual histories). Finally, there is no guarantee that CF is true: it may be that 
CF is false (we think that talking about the likelihood of its being true is circular, if meaningful at 
all).9 It may even be that the best theories that explain the experience of CF are those that tell us 
that it is false to a larger or smaller extent. Why do we often adhere in practice to the option that 
CF is true? It is perhaps a more convenient choice, but it is not compelling. (Contemporary brain 
science gives good reasons to think that a substantial part of CF is false.) 
 
 
7 We focus here on the case in which CF is true, because it is the simplest way to present our main point. 
But importantly we are not committed to CF being true about the world or even to its being highly likely 
true. Theories of physics (and of special sciences which reduce to physics) are constructed so as to 
explain CF, but explaining CF does not mean vindicating CF as true about the world. Our scientific 
theories may or may not entail a correspondence between the content of CF and reality. It may turn out 
that the best explanation for the data of CF is that its contents are partly false; contemporary science gives 
us good reasons to think that this is the case (see Shenker 2020c). We do not think that this result is 
catastrophic - unlike Albert, as we point out below. On an even more skeptical view concerning the status 
of the CF data, see also (Shenker 2020b). 
8 See (Firt, Hemmo, Shenker 2020) on Hempel’s dilemma. 
9 It is circular because it requires postulating a probability measure (or a typicality measure) over 
counterfactual states, where the choice of measure, according to which the truth of CF is highly probable, 
if it is empirical at all and not given to us by some external source of information (see below), is 




In The Mentaculus, by contrast, the truth of CF has a much stronger status: the laws of nature are 
selected so as to guarantee its likelihood, given some understanding (which Flat Physicalism 
rejects) of what counterfactuals are and what probability in physics is (see some details in Albert 
2000, 2014; Hemmo and Shenker 2012, 2015, 2016). The crucial difference between the two 
approaches is this. In Flat Physicalism the schema is CF → NM → PH+SP; where CF may not be 
true. in The Mentaculus, the schema is NM+PH+SP → CF (with high probability), so that CF is 
likely to be true, and this avoids the “skeptical catastrophe” (Albert 2000), In our view, although 
a world in which NM+PH+SP obtains is nice and comforting in that - if you accept the right notions 
of counterfactuals and probability - your experience and memories are likely to be true, this 
argument provides a less simple system, which can be appreciated considering the following 
questions: why are NM+PH+SP accepted as part of the “best system” in The Mentaculus; and what 
kind of support do we have for postulating them? One option is that the truth of NM+PH+SP is 
tested empirically via its prediction of CF: it is in this sense that this theory is empirical. In this 
option The Mentaculus relies on CF to the same degree that Flat Physicalism does, and then the 
degree of simplicity is the same as in Flat Physicalism. But since The Mentaculus wants something 
stronger, something that will guarantee high probability for the truth of CF, it needs to give PH+SP 
a status that is stronger than that of CF, that is: independent of CF. But what is the source of 
PH+SP? Where does this stronger support come from? We think that this source is over and above 
physics and adds substantial complexity to the metaphysics of The Mentaculus. 
 
In what follows we shall not expand on this theme of what explains what. Instead, in this paper we 
describe Flat Physicalism and go into some details in comparing it with The Mentaculus. The paper 
is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we describe Flat Physicalism, and in the following sections 
we compare it with The Mentaculus. Readers who are familiar with Flat Physicalism, or who are 
interested in first seeing in what sense we think Flat Physicalism is “better” (in the sense of “best 
system”) than The Mentaculus, may skip Section 2 and return to it later. Section 2 is partitioned 
into subsections for ease of reference or of returning. We describe the basic ontology of this theory 
(Sec. 2.1 and 2.2); how probability arises and how to derive SP (if true) even when the underlying 
micro-trajectory is deterministic (Sec, 2.3); the status of the PH and how to derive it (if it is true) 
(Sec. 2.4); what it takes to reduce the special sciences to fundamental physics in the face of the 
idea of multiple realization (Sec. 2.5); the implications of this idea with respect to psychology 
(Sec. 2.6). In Section 3 we address the metaphysical framework in which Albert and Loewer 
formulate The Mentaculus: David Lewis’ metaphysics and the best system approach to laws and 
Loewer’s improvement of it in his (2020b) Package Deal Approach (PDA). In Section 4 we 
consider the non-reductive nature of the special sciences in the Mentaculus. 
 
2. Flat Physicalism 
In this section we present Flat Physicalism. While Flat Physicalism resembles The Mentaculus in 
that it is an “outrageously ambitious” theory that is “arguably a complete scientific theory of the 
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universe”, and that its way to achieve this aim is by a generalization of statistical mechanics, it 
differs from The Mentaculus in important points concerning its conceptual basis. The difference 
fundamentally concerns the metaphysical basis: The Mentaculus is seen by its authors as a “best 
system” that is supposed to provide an informative and simple description of the Humean base, 
which is the fundamental reality, whereas in Flat Physicalism the fundamental reality is the 
physical one, and there is nothing else and in particular nothing more fundamental than physics.  
 
One important consequence of this difference is that in Flat Physicalism everything is supposed to 
be accounted for by NM and CF only (see Sec. 2.1 and 2.2), whereas in The Mentaculus additional 
fundamental elements are assumed, namely PH and SP. In this sense Flat Physicalism, if 
successful, is simpler (see Sec. 2.3 and 2.4). In addition, Flat Physicalism derives from NM and 
CF the laws and properties of the special sciences including psychology (Sec. 2.5 and 2.6), as well 
as a notion of chance in a deterministic world (see Sec. 2.3).   
 
Due to this difference, in Flat Physicalism - unlike The Mentaculus - the PH, SP, the special 
sciences and the notion of chance are all derived from CF+NM. This is the main reason why it is 
simpler, and hence “better”, than The Mentaculus. Perhaps The Mentaculus can be changed so as 
to incorporate some ideas from Flat Physicalism, to become simpler, more reductionist, and more 
physicalist, but then it becomes so close to reductive physicalism that the difference may cease to 
be significant. We will discuss this consequence later. 
 
As we said above, in this paper we present statistical mechanics as the project of accounting for 
the thermodynamic (and other) regularities by classical mechanics, as is usual (and as was done 
with respect to The Mentaculus in Sec. 1 above). The justification for doing so is the conjecture 
that although classical mechanics is strictly speaking false, it preserves some of the salient 
explanatory and predictive aspects of the true fundamental physics, under the appropriate 
conditions. (See Wallace 2001 Sec. 1, and Ladyman and Ross 2007. See Shenker 2020 on quantum 
statistical mechanics.) 
2.1 Microstates: fundamental physics 
Statistical mechanics, as the project of accounting for thermodynamics by classical mechanics, 
consists of two (related) stages. First, express the thermodynamic quantities (such as volume and 
temperature) in terms of mechanical quantities (like mass, position, and velocity). Second, prove 
that due to the laws of mechanics (e.g., F=ma) and some contingent fact (i.e., together with some 
auxiliary hypotheses10) these mechanical quantities evolve in a way that mirrors the 
thermodynamic regularities (such as the ideal gas law or the Second Law). In this paper we focus 
 
10 These auxiliary hypotheses are described in (Shenker 2017b, 2017c). 
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on the first stage (for the second stage see Hemmo and Shenker 2012, 2016, Shenker 2017b, 
2017c), and therefore we begin with the ontology of fundamental physics. 
 
According to classical mechanics the universe consists of particles each having properties or 
parameters such as mass or charge, that are subject to certain constraints and limitations such as 
total volume available to the particles or the total energy available to all of them, and each of them 
has, at each point of time, precise and well defined position and velocity.11 The positions and 
velocities of all the particles at a time is called the universe’s “microstate” at that time.12 The 
microstate, together with the parameters and constraints, is everything that there is at every 
moment, according to mechanics. For brevity, henceforth by the term “microstate” we will refer 
also to the parameters and constraints. 
 
The following terminological remark is of utmost importance for understanding statistical 
mechanics. There are various notions of ‘microscopic’ in the literature: the term sometimes means 
small, and sometimes part of a whole. But in statistical mechanics it is customary to use the term 
‘microstate’ to denote the complete state of the system of interest, or of the world, according to 
the fundamental theory, which is here classical mechanics. For instance, in classical mechanics the 
precise positions and velocities of the particles of the entire universe is a microstate, despite the 
fact that it is neither small nor part of anything. 
 
Albert (2000 Ch. 1) points out that the microstates are not independent of each other: since 
instantaneous velocity is part of the microstate, the microstate in a given moment imposes 
constraints on the positions in the microstates in its temporal vicinity. The requirement of 
independence may be important for Lewis’s original characterization of the Humean base (see Sec.  
3), but (we think) not for Loewer’s (2020) recent PDA version of it (that we address in Sec. 3). In 
any case, according to Flat Physicalism the fundamental reality is as described by physics.  
 
Given the microstate at some moment, together with the parameters and constraints, the equations 
of motion of classical mechanics determine the microstates at all other moments, that is, an entire 
history or an entire trajectory of the universe.13 While we can perhaps conceive of counterfactual 
microstates, and hence on counterfactual histories, the actual micro-history is everything that there 
is, according to classical mechanics. 
 
 
11 Zeno’s arrow paradox needs to be solved here; see (Arntzenius 2000). 
12 Microstates can be thought of as events, not states. We don’t expand on this point. 
13 In quantum mechanics the micro-history of the universe is determined by the equations of motion of the 
quantum state. Some interpretations postulate also “collapse” of the quantum state, either 
deterministically or non-deterministically.  
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2.2 Aspects: macrovariables and macrostates 
Normally, we are not interested in the full details of the microstate of a system or its micro-history: 
we are interested in certain sub-systems of the universe, and in certain properties of those sub-
systems. In particular, we are interested in properties of systems that exhibit regularities that we 
can follow. For example, in thermodynamic systems we are interested in the volume of a gas, or 
the degree of uniformity of its temperature. We just said that the microstate is everything that there 
is; and this entails that properties like volume or temperature cannot be facts over and above the 
microstate. Indeed, those properties are aspects of the microstates, sometimes called 
macrovariables.14 For example, volume is an aspect since it is a function (certain coarse-grained 
distribution) of the positions of the system’s particles, and does not pertain to all the details of 
these positions nor to the velocities of the particles. (The description of an aspect (of a 
macrovariable) is a partial description of the microstate; but we stress that we focus on what there 
is, about ontology, and not about how it can be known or described.)  
 
It has been discovered - and this is a highly non-trivial discovery by the creators of statistical 
mechanics - that certain aspects stand in lawful relations to certain other aspects, either at a time 
(synchronically) or over time (diachronically), and these aspects and their lawful relations have 
been identified with thermodynamic magnitudes and the laws governing them. Here is what we 
mean by “identified”: Since the microstates and micro history are everything that there is in the 
universe, the thermodynamic magnitudes and regularities are nothing over and above aspects of 
the mechanical microstates and micro histories. That is to say: The thermodynamic magnitudes do 
not only “supervene” on the mechanical ones; they are them.15  
 
A famous example of an aspect is the Maxwell-Boltzmann energy distribution. To know whether 
this aspect obtains in the particular sample of diluted gas in front of us, we carry out indirect 
measurements of other aspects, e.g., to see whether the gas is uniformly spread in the container 
 
14 The notion of aspect is in some sense perspectival. But, since this perspective is derived from the 
complete microstate by partial description there is no danger of inconsistency between the perspectives, 
nor of not knowing “perspective of what”, especially where theoretical entities are concerned (see 
Arabatzis 2016).  
15 Gibbs (1902) talked about “analogies” and only later - and not always - his quantities came to be 
understood in terms of identity statements. In Boltzmann’s thought (see Uffink 2017) this is less clear, 
and Boltzmann and Maxwell came to identify certain macrovariables with certain thermodynamic 
quantities due to the similarity in the regularities that they exhibit. See overviews in Frigg 2008, Uffink 
2007, Sklar 1993. The Gibbsian picture of statistical mechanics differs from the Boltzmannian one in 
important details (see Callender 1999; Uffink 2007; 2017; Frigg 2008, Wallace 2015, Goldstein, 
Lebowitz, Tumulka, and Zanghì 2020), and therefore the predictions of these two approaches agree only 
approximately (see Werndl and Frigg 2017, Jaynes 1965). However, in both traditions thermodynamic 
magnitudes are associated with macrovariables or functions of macrovariables. See more on the 
connection between these pictures in (Hemmo and Shenker 2012, Ch. 11). 
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and its temperature is distributed uniformly in it, or whether when we increase the pressure on it, 
its temperature increases in direct proportion, in accordance with the ideal gas law. And so, the 
main idea of statistical mechanics, which makes it so important and useful, is that in order to 
provide a successful and informative account of thermodynamic phenomena one needs only partial 
information about the microstate of a system, that is, one needs only to specify its aspect. 
 
The notion of aspect has two characteristics, and their interplay is the core of statistical mechanics 
and the basis of expanding it to a general theory of reductive physicalism.  
 
(i) The aspect of the actual microstate is what we observe. When we measure the volume of a gas, 
for example, what we interact with is the actual particular distribution of the positions (or the 
actual sequences of particular positions) of the actual particular sample of gas in front of us. There 
isn’t anything else in the world for us to observe. (We don’t measure sets of counterfactual states; 
see (ii) below.) 
 
(ii) The aspect of the actual microstate describes an equivalence set of microstates, called “a 
macrostate”. When we measure the volume of a gas, for example, and find that it is (say) V, this 
partial information is all that we have about this sample of gas, and as far as we are concerned it 
could have been in any number of microstates, provided that they share this aspect, this coarse- 
grained partial description of the molecules’ positions. Thus, this ignorance concerning the other 
details of the gas’ microstate (everything except V) gives rise to an equivalence set of microstates, 
namely, those that share the aspect V and differ in all other aspects. The set is an epistemological 
notion. Ontologically, one microstate in the set is actual at the time of measurement, and all the 
others are counterfactual; some will become actual in other times, most will not.  
 
The set of counterfactual microstates that share an aspect is sometimes called macrostate, and this 
is how we shall use this term here. The aspect (macrovariable) of an actual individual microstate 
(or micro history) is “out there in the world”, as the entire actual microstate is; but the macrostate 
- as set of counterfactual microstates - is not “out there in the world”; it is only a theoretical 
construct. Microstates and aspects (macrovariables) are in the world; macrostates are not. 
 
Of course, macrostates are extremely important theoretical constructs, and serve various epistemic 
purposes: they enable us to talk about entropy (i.e., the degree to which the energy of a system can 
be exploited by manipulating the system via external constraints) and probability (i.e. predicting 
the future values of the aspects (macrovariables) of the system’s microstates). We discuss 
probability in Section 2.3. We discuss the notion of entropy only very briefly in Section 2.4 (see 
Hemmo and Shenker 2012 Ch. 7). (In the literature the terms macrostates and macrovariables are 
sometimes used interchangeably,16 or other terms are used. See various examples in Ehrenfest and 
 
16 In (Hemmo and Shenker 2016) the terminology is a bit different: macrovariable refers to any aspect of 
a microstate, and macrostate refers to those that appear in our experience. 
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Ehrenfest 1912; Sklar 1993; Lebowitz 1993; Goldstein and Lebowitz 2004; Frigg 2008; Uffink 
2007.) 
2.3 Probability in Flat Physicalism vs. The Mentaculus 
Since Flat Physicalism is committed to the idea that the microstate and micro-trajectory of the 
universe are everything that there is in the universe, if there are probabilistic facts in the universe 
then those have to be part of this fundamental ontology, namely of CF+NM, for there is nothing 
else that they can be. In this section we show how probabilities come about in a deterministic world 
in Flat Physicalism. This reductive approach is by contrast to the non-reductive Mentaculus 
proposed by Albert and Loewer.  
 
Albert and Loewer’s Statistical Postulate (SP) posits a probability distribution over the past low 
entropy macrostate of the universe: the postulate is that this probability distribution is uniform 
relative to the Lebesgue measure. According to Albert, as we saw above, 
 
“the right probability distribution to use for making inferences about the past and the future 
is the one that’s uniform, on the standard (i.e., Lebesgue) measure, over those regions of 
phase space which are compatible with whatever other information – either in the form of 
laws or in the form of contingent empirical facts – we happen to have.” (Albert 2000, p. 
96)  
 
Since SP forms part of The Mentaculus, it is taken to be a fact over and above CF+NM. Since SP 
is defined over counterfactual microstates (or micro-trajectories), it denotes a fact in addition to 
the actual trajectory of the universe, which is fixed by CF+NM. The justification for adding SP to 
The Mentaculus is that together with it (but not without it) The Mentaculus becomes the “best 
system” (Loewer 2001, Albert 2014, pp. 23-24). Albert explains this move by an “audience with 
God” who upon our request for the “best system” of our world adds SP over and above NM: 
 
“I have something more to tell you as well… Something about the initial condition of the 
world… it was one of those which is typical with respect to a certain particular probability 
distribution - the Boltzmann–Gibbs distribution, for example. The best I can do by way of 
a simple and informative description of that initial condition is to tell you that it was 
precisely the sort of condition that you would expect, that… you would have been rational 
to bet on, if the initial condition of the world had in fact been selected by means of a 
genuinely dynamically chancy procedure where the probability of this or that particular 
condition’s being selected is precisely the one given in the probability distribution of 
Boltzmann and Gibbs.” (Albert 2014, pp. 23-24)  
 
God in this parable just informs us, top-down, that if we assume this particular probability measure 
then the actual matters of fact, the actual observed regularities, will turn out likely, so that it would 
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be rational to expect them (perhaps in the framework of Lewis’s concept of probability, see Lewis 
1980b; Hoefer 2019). Albert takes this to justify endorsing SP as part of The Mentaculus. This 
kind of justification for choosing a probability measure, and for explaining the actual matters of 
fact, is assumed by supporters of the so-called “typicality” approach (although for some of them 
the measure is not one of probability; see Dürr 2001). The typicality approach is the subject of an 
ongoing debate (see Dürr 2001, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi 1992, Maudlin 2007a, Callender 2007, 
Goldstein 2012). Some think that the probability measure can be derived from theorems of 
mechanics or by dynamical considerations: were this the case it would provide a way to derive the 
SP from CF+NM, but we have shown that those considerations are irrelevant for determining the 
measure in question. This means that the typicality approach is non-reductive and introduces the 
measure as an additional fact, not derivable from the mechanical principles and the contingent 
facts. (On why the typicality approach is unacceptable for being circular see Hemmo and Shenker 
2015b.)  
 
In the “best system” approach, within which Loewer and Albert work, adding a postulate such as 
SP to the laws of nature is justified if it makes the system of laws the “best” balance between 
informativeness and simplicity with respect to the Humean base, even if it comes about via divine 
revelation. (See Sec. 3 for more on the relation between The Mentaculus and the Humean base in 
a Lewis-style approach.) 
 
Can the endorsement of the SP be justified on the basis of CF+NM, without a decree from God? 
Arguably, such a possibility would lead to a simpler and “better” system. We now turn to showing 
how the probability in classical statistical mechanics can be derived from NM and CF, so that there 
is no need for an independent postulate like SP. By this we will show that the probability is a 
feature of the actual (deterministic) trajectory of the universe, and in this sense, it is an objective 
feature of the world despite the underlying determinism.  
  
Consider Figure 1 which illustrates the state space of some system. The microstates in this state 
space are partitioned into sets (M0, M1, M2) that are macrostates: in each set all the microstates 
share some aspect (macrovariable) of interest. Other details in the figure are explained later. 
 
Figure 1           
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Suppose we prepare a system G with a thermodynamic property associated with the macrovariable 
M0. This means that the initial actual microstate x(t0) of G - whose macrovariable M0 we actually 
observe and prepare - belongs to the macrostate-set M0 in Figure 1, in which all the microstates 
share the same macrovariable M0; all of them except x(t0) are counterfactual and do not obtain in 
reality at t0. We now follow the evolution of each of the continuous infinity of microstates in M0, 
tracking its trajectory from its starting point within M0 at t0 until time t1, and call the set of all the 
end points B(t1).17 The Lebesgue measure of B(t1) is the same as that of M0, satisfying Liouville’s 
theorem. Needless to say, saying that “we calculate” B(t1) in this way is a huge idealization: we 
may say that Laplace’s Demon carries out this calculation, but in practice there are shortcuts for 
special interesting cases (see discussion of these shortcuts in Hemmo and Shenker 2012, Sec. 6.5 
and 6.6). Despite these shortcuts, discussing the idealization is important in order to understand 
how probability emerges in the theory and thus helps to see what exactly is involved in those 
shortcuts. We shall see below additional shortcuts, and those need to be understood as such; 
without understanding the idealization it is hard to see that our actual practices are shortcuts and 
those may be given an exaggerated ontological status. This is why we emphasize them here and 
below. 
 
In general region B(t1) partly overlaps more than one macrostate, and in our example it partly 
overlaps with M1 and partly M2. In this sense, the following if-statement is an objective fact about 
the system G: if it is prepared in a microstate with the mechanical macrovariable M0, then its final 
microstate will be one with either macrovariable M1 or M2. And the transition (or conditional) 
probability that a system prepared in M0 at t0 will end up in M1 at t1 is determined by the relative 
measure of the overlap of B(t1) with M1; and similarly, for M2: That is, the transition probability 
(or conditional probability) is given by the following probability rule: 
 
Probability Rule:   P(M1, t1 | M0, t0) = m(B(t1) & M1) .     (1) 
 
Here “P(M1, t1 | M0, t0)” is the probability that the microstate of the system at t1 will turn out to be 
in M1, conditional on its being in M0 at t0;  “B(t1) & M1” denotes the intersection of the phase 
space regions B(t1) and M1; and m(x) is the normalized measure of the region x in the phase space, 
given some appropriate measure m; we discuss below how to determine the measure.18 Obviously, 
the empirical adequacy of this rule should be tested against the relative frequencies we observe. 
 
 
17 The region B(t1) is a sort of Poincare section: Normally Poincare sections are used to describe 
semi-periodic systems, but the principle is the same. 
18 If the states are confined to, for example, an energy hypersurface, on which all regions have 
measure zero relative to the entire phase space, then the above rule is modified such that the 
measures of sets are relative to this hypersurface. 
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How is m(x) fixed? According to Flat Physicalism, since the micro history is everything that there 
is, the task is to derive m(x) from it. Briefly and ideally, this is the way to do it.  
 
Step 1: given some particular M0 of interest, calculate the continuous sequence of regions like 
B(t1) in Figure 1, along the entire infinite continuous trajectories; this is, of course, another huge 
idealization, for which there are useful shortcuts. Step 1 is based on CF+NM (but not on SP or 
PH). We assume here that CF is true (see Sec. 1) and we don’t seek to derive the truth of CF (with 
high probability) from anything, since we don’t think that this is possible (see below).  
 
Step 2: follow the actual micro-trajectory as it passes through these B(t) regions, and count (by 
calculation) the actual relative frequencies of the different Mi along the infinite continuous micro-
trajectory. Again, our resources here are only CF+NM. Of course, this is another huge idealization. 
The shortcut that we use in practice is to measure the Mi values in actual experiments on similar 
systems in the actual short history through which we live, and to generalize the observed relative 
frequencies by induction, hoping that it works; the usual problem of induction applies.  
 
Step 3: choose a measure over the B(t), and thus in practice over the entire accessible region, that 
will be compatible with these relative frequencies. Step 3 is a derivation from CF+NM only. In 
general, there will be more than one such measure; any of them will do; choose any of them, either 
arbitrarily or the most convenient one. Since the measure is chosen such that it fits the observed 
relative frequencies, it cannot be taken to account for the high probability of those same relative 
frequencies; this is why, as we said, one cannot come up without vicious circularity with an 
empirical theory which gives high probability for the truth of CF. This point stands at the heart of 
the question concerning the origin and nature of the probability measure (or the measure of 
typicality) in statistical mechanics.      
 
Notice that in this approach the obtained probability measure can be time-dependent. Indeed, even 
SP is a time dependent probability distribution. Notice that distributing probability uniformly in a 
time-independent way yields empirically inadequate results, which is a known problem for 
Boltzmann’s approach; see (Hemmo and Shenker 2015c). 
 
Step 4: apply the results, possibly by tracing backwards the history of the universe until the putative 
“big bang” moment, and apply the chosen measure. The result will be SP only if it is true. In this 
way SP is not a postulate at all, but a result derived from CF+NM.  
 
By adding SP to The Mentaculus Albert and Loewer assume - without justification, neither 
theoretical nor empirical - that Steps 1-3 will yield the particular probability distribution that it 
mentions. In Flat Physicalism, by contrast, there is no guarantee that the probability distribution 
described in SP is true. It is endorsed subject to the assumption involved in the shortcuts and 
inductive generalization described above. Flat Physicalism also brings out the fact that the measure 
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is not a fact out there in the world, but a mere convenient tool for calculations. In The Mentaculus, 
it is given the status of an additional law of nature, irreducible to the rest (Loewer 2001, 2008); in 
Flat Physicalism, it is derived from CF+NM. Since classical mechanics describes the world in 
terms of differential equations, there is no way to avoid introducing CF in addition to NM. (See 
more details, including shortcuts to overcome the difficulties of the idealizations involved in the 
Flat Physicalist account of probability, in Hemmo and Shenker 2012, 2019 and Shenker 2017b, 
2017c.)  
 
Since our description of how the chances come about is reductive and is in fact a generalization of 
our experience of relative frequencies of certain macrovariables along the actual trajectory of the 
universe, the probability law (1) is itself not fundamental, but a derived law. 
 
In the Flat Physicalist concept of probability described above the probability measure is fixed by 
the harmony between two elements: (I) The dynamics, (II) The partition of the state space into 
macrostates. Let us comment on these two. 
 
(I) The dynamics. On the Flat Physicalist concept of probability, a different dynamics, or different 
initial conditions, will yield different probabilities. The probability rule is general, in this respect, 
and should it be discovered that the dynamics of the universe is different from what we thought, 
the probability rule will be able to accommodate this fact.  
 
(II) The partition. On the Flat Physicalist concept of probability, a different partition of the state 
space into macrostates will yield different probabilities. It is useful to see the significance of this 
point by comparing Flat Physicalism with The Mentaculus. Albert and Loewer’s SP pertains to a 
certain macrostate, the “big bang” one. But, the complete ontology of the big bang is given by a 
particular (unknown) actual microstate, which is supposed to be a member of the “big bang” 
macrostate set. The big bang actual microstate - as any microstate - has (infinitely) many aspects, 
(infinitely) many macrovariables, and each of them gives rise to a different partition of the state 
space, and thus to a different big bang macrostate. Which of them is the one that features in PH 
and SP? In Albert and Loewer’s Mentaculus approach a certain partition of the state space into 
macrostates has a preferred status, and it is not clear where exactly this preferred status comes 
from. There seems to be something a-priori, and even something metaphysically dualistic, about 
this preferred partition. Flat Physicalism, by contrast, accepts that according to NM all the 
partitions to macrostates are on a par, and the probability rule of Flat Physicalism gives rise to a 
host of probability statements, each pertaining to a different partition of the state space. The only 
way to explain why it is that we, human beings, experience certain macrovariables rather than 
others (e.g., the thermodynamic macrovariables), pertains to contingent facts about our 
physiology, the way that we interact with our environment and facts about the physics of the mind 
(see Hemmo and Shenker 2016, on “Ludwig’s problem”). Those are not additional facts: they are 
all part of CF+NM, because there is nothing else in the universe, according to Flat Physicalism. 
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(This is why reductive physicalism about the mind is an essential element of statistical mechanics; 
see Shenker 2017a, Hemmo and Shenker 2020.)  
 
What is the fate of the Second Law in Flat Physicalism? Suppose that the probability rule (1) yields 
high transition probabilities for entropy increase as required by the Second Law. This would mean 
that along the actual trajectory of the universe the relative frequencies of macrostates conform to 
the Second Law probabilities. But one cannot derive from this result anything about the behavior 
of other counterfactual trajectories. In general, the probability rule is compatible with Second Law 
behavior along one trajectory as well as with Maxwellian Demons along other trajectories (see 
Hemmo and Shenker 2010, 2012, 2016).  
 
As we said above concerning other elements of The Mentaculus, if one accepts the Lewis-style 
“best system” approach, then the only criterion for whether or not one needs to introduce an 
additional postulate to one’s laws of nature, e.g. adding the SP to CF+NM, and the way that one 
should understand the notion of probability in a deterministic world, is if it contributes to the 
system being “better” (see Hoefer 2019 on Humean chance). We think that since Flat Physicalism 
derives the notion of probability from CF+NM, then it is “better” (the other option is that there is 
an external source of support outside or in addition to the micro-trajectory; see Sec.1; and this will 
make both the theory and the Humean base much more complex).  
2.4 The Past Hypothesis in Flat Physicalism 
In Section 2.3 we saw how probability comes about in Flat Physicalism as a consequence of a 
certain harmony between the dynamics and the partition of the state space into macrostates, which 
is a consequence of CF+NM. Assume a certain combination of NM and CF, and focus on a certain 
partition, e.g., a partition into thermodynamic macrostates. And suppose that we can prove that 
(either generally or for certain conditions) a mechanical counterpart of the Second Law of 
thermodynamics will continue to obtain. Then, as is well known, it is a theorem that a time reversed 
“Second Law” obtains as well, and to avoid this consequence Feynman (1965) and Albert (2000) 
postulate the PH. On this view the PH is a postulate, it is not derived from CF+NM. However, Flat 
Physicalism seeks to derive everything from CF+NM. How is the PH derived? 
 
Here we employ three steps. 
 
First, the temporal directionality. It is a point of logic that asymmetric consequences are not 
derivable from symmetric assumptions. Hence to break the symmetry between past and future a 
symmetry breaking assumption needs to be introduced. There is no way out of this. The only 
question is whether there is a trick that will enable it without adding anything to CF+NM. We 
think there is; our solution is that what is felt in our mind to be a temporal asymmetry is reduced 
to a non-temporal asymmetry of the structure of our brain, which gives rise to the psychological 
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arrow of time, and which is part of CF. By contrast, Albert (2000, 2014) and Loewer (2001, 2012, 
2020a) argue that the symmetry-breaking fact is the PH; see our (2019a). 
 
The second step, once we have a temporal asymmetry, is to retrodict the past. Predictions are 
carried out using probability statements as illustrated in Figure 1 in Section 2.3, and they contain 
ignorance concerning the macrostates (or more precisely macrovariables) that will actually obtain 
when the time comes. Retrodictions, by contrast, involve some ignorance as well as some 
knowledge concerning the macrostates (or more precisely macrovariables) that actually obtained 
in certain moments in the past. (Here we need a concept of records, that we don’t discuss here; our 
concept is different from Albert’s 2000.) Conceptually, retrodictions are measurements: we 
retrodict the past possible macrovariable in a manner similar to the prediction of Figure 1, and then 
“measure”, by recollecting, which of the macrovariables actually obtained (for details see Hemmo 
and Shenker 2012, Ch. 10). Measurements, in this framework, end by the measurer having a certain 
brain state in which she believes that a certain state of affairs obtained, and therefore this notion is 
perfectly reducible to CF+NM. 
 
Notice that on this view Flat Physicalism explains retrodictions in a way that does not guarantee 
that the PH obtains! Postulating the PH may solve what Albert has called the “skeptical 
catastrophe”, according to which The Mentaculus minus the PH implies that our memories of past 
events, including the past events that we take to support NM and CF in the first place, are not true 
(or unreliable). But - as desirable as this result may be - it is not guaranteed (not even 
probabilistically) by CF+NM. Flat Physicalism accommodates the fact that CF+NM are 
compatible with violations of the Second Law as well as with the possibility that the PH is false. 
The “skeptical catastrophe” must be dealt with by NM and CF alone; and the way this done in Flat 
Physicalism is simply by taking CF to be true as a starting point, or a working hypothesis, although 
it is open to the possibility that its contents is false (see Sec. 1). 
 
Flat Physicalism also accommodates the fact that there is a host of different partitions of the state 
space into macrostates, all of which are on a par, while the thermodynamic partition is just one of 
them. The PH in The Mentaculus concerns the “low-entropy highly condensed big-bang sort of 
macrocondition it is that the normal inferential procedures of cosmology will eventually present 
to us.” (Albert 2000, p. 96). That is, it elevates the thermodynamic partition to the status of a law, 
even though given NM all partitions of the state space have equal status. As we said, the only way 
to explain the preference of the thermodynamic partition pertains to contingent facts about our 
physiology, the way that we interact with our environment and facts about the physics of the mind 
(see Hemmo and Shenker 2016, on “Ludwig’s problem”). Although in Flat Physicalism these facts 
are all part of CF+NM, they do not give the PH a preferred status, let alone the status of a law of 
nature.   
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Finally, the PH is given in terms of “entropy”. What is entropy, in Flat Physicalism? Again, we 
will not go here into the full details, and just make the following remarks concerning what entropy 
is and how it is to be expressed in terms of CF+NM. 
  
(1) While the meaning or reference of thermodynamic entropy is not always clear (see e.g., Uffink 
2001) one of the ways it is often understood is as quantifying the degree to which energy can be 
exploited. In our view this idea should be translated, or rather transformed, into the notion of 
controlling the system’s microstate. Intuitively, the smaller the macrostate-set corresponding to 
the macrovariables we can manipulate is, the closer we are to zooming in on the actual microstate 
and controlling it. This is the intuition behind associating the measure of macrostates with their 
entropy (in a Boltzmannian framework; for the connection to the Gibbsian approach see our 2012 
Ch. 11).  
 
(2) But how should the measure be chosen? We saw in Section 2.3 that this is a subtle and 
problematic issue that invites fallacies or petitio principii. To avoid these dangers, we note the 
following.  
 
(3) In thermodynamics, entropy quantifies the degree of exploitability of energy only if the Second 
Law is true (see Fermi 1936, and our 2012 Ch. 2).  
 
(4) Entropy and probability are two distinct concepts: the measure of entropy should quantify 
exploitability, and the measure of probability should provide correct predictions of future 
macrostates. Therefore, there is no reason at all - elegance notwithstanding - that the measure in 
the two cases should be the same. We propose (in our 2012, Ch. 7) to choose the measure of 
entropy such that the phenomena of the Second Law of thermodynamics will be recovered; we do 
that in view of comment (3) above.  
 
(5) Finally, notice that entropy is a number without units, a hint that it is not out there in the world: 
there isn’t, and there cannot be, an entropy measuring device. Entropy is the measure of a set of 
counterfactual states of affairs. The only way to measure entropy is to measure some 
macrovariable, e.g., the degree of uniformity of temperature in a given sample of gas, and then to 
define the macrostate set of counterfactual microstates that share this macrovariable, and then 
introduce the measure as in remark (4) above, and calculate the entropy. Entropy is not a fact “out 
there in the world”, but a very useful theoretical construct. The PH inherits this nature of entropy. 
 
2.5 Special sciences: a reductive account 
Sometimes it seems that the special sciences, such as biology or geology, describe facts about the 
world that are over and above those described by physics. The commitment of Flat Physicalism is 
that this is not the case. If the microstates and micro histories are everything that there is, then the 
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magnitudes and regularities described by the special sciences must be features of the microstates 
and micro histories; for there is nothing else they can be. Reductive type-identity physicalism is the 
view that the magnitudes and regularities of the special sciences are nothing but aspects 
(macrovariables) and the regularities that they may exhibit along the micro trajectory, while the 
complete microstate evolves according to the equation of motion. In order to come up with the 
best system of the laws of a certain special science (e.g., biology, economics), one needs to follow 
the same kind of derivation we presented above with respect to the laws and facts of 
thermodynamics (which is one example of a special science, after all) from CF+NM. This means 
that according to Flat Physicalism the best system of laws for the entire world which includes the 
laws of all the special sciences is NM.   
 
Our example of a special sciences is thermodynamics. In our view the science of thermodynamics, 
despite the fact that it is studied by physicists, has the status of a “special science”: the very project 
called “statistical mechanics” is the attempt to account for the thermodynamic magnitudes and 
regularities in term of those of fundamental physics (be it Flat Physicalism or The Mentaculus), 
and this is precisely the way that the (other) special sciences are treated in Flat Physicalism. In Flat 
Physicalism, then, the microstate and the micro history are everything that there is in the universe, 
and therefore the magnitudes of thermodynamics (such as volume or temperature) are (identical 
to) aspects of the microstates, and the regularities exhibited by the thermodynamic magnitudes are 
(identical to) the ways these aspects evolve along the micro-history of the universe and its 
subsystems. According to Flat Physicalism this is the way - the only way - to account for the other 
special sciences as well, for example biology or geology, because the microstate and the micro 
history are everything that there is. (We return later to the subtle question of the status of 
thermodynamics in The Mentaculus.) 
 
The picture that Flat Physicalism proposes is flat: there are no levels of reality. So-called “high-
level” kinds (such as temperature) are understood here as aspects, or macrovariables, given by 
partial descriptions of the microstructure of a single level of entities and their interactions, as 
described by the fundamental theories of physics. This is the essence of Flat Physicalism. 
 
One challenge for Flat Physicalism in this context is the following. It is a prevalent view in 
contemporary philosophy of science that certain special sciences kinds are multiply realized (or at 
least multiply realizable) by physical kinds. Allowing for multiple-realizability is more or less a 
standard view in contemporary thinking, especially in functionalism (since Putnam 1975; Fodor 
1974; Davidson 1970; and of course, Lewis 1966, 1980a). When taken together with 
supervenience of the special sciences kinds and properties on physical ones, this view is called 
“non-reductive physicalism”. Whether or not experience supports this claim is an open question 
(see e.g., Polger and Shapiro 2016); We shall not argue for nor against the factual existence of 
multiple realizability. Our task, rather, is to show how Flat Physicalism can account for the 
appearance of multiple realizability, should it turn out to be an empirically verified fact. Here is 
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an interesting example. The macrovariables associated with the thermodynamic magnitude called 
“temperature” in an ideal gas (in which there are no interactions between the molecules) is different 
from the one in a van der Waals gas (in which there are the simplest interactions between the 
molecules), and the two cases agree quantitatively only in certain limiting conditions. “Spin 
temperature” is yet another aspect of the (quantum!) microstate, and there is supposed to be 
quantitative agreement (in relevant scale) between it and the other macrovariables associated with 
the notion of “temperature”. Frigg and Hoefer (2015) see this as a case of multiple realization. 
They write:  
 
“[M]any non-fundamental properties are multiply realisable, meaning that the same non-
fundamental property can be realised by a number of distinct fundamental kinds. This is 
true not only in psychology (the classical example being pain); we find multiply realised 
properties even in close-to-fundamental physics: temperature in gases and temperature in 
spin systems have completely different micro-realisers.” (Frigg and Hoefer 2015; our 
italics.)   
 
For Frigg and Hoefer there are high-level facts that are not in the microstate or micro history: for 
example, the fact that “temperature in gases” and “temperature in spin systems” are both cases of 
“temperature” cannot be explained by the micro-structure of the world, because at the micro level 
they are “completely different” - they do not share any aspect (any macrovariable) that could 
explain this fact. By “genuine multiple realization” we mean a case in which the fact that the 
different “low-level” cases appear to be multiple realizations of the same “high-level” fact cannot 
be explained by a hidden or unnoticed “low-level” fact that they share. According to Frigg and 
Hoefer (if we understand them correctly) the case of temperature is one of genuine multiple 
realization.  
 
Flat Physicalism, insisting that there is nothing over and above the microstate and micro history, 
has to offer a different account of the case of temperature. Two options are open for the Flat 
Physicalist in this case.  
 
Option 1 is that, first impression notwithstanding and even contemporary scientific knowledge 
notwithstanding, there is an aspect of the microstate that is shared between “temperature in gases” 
and “temperature in spin systems”, and this shared aspect is (identical with) “temperature”.  
 
Option 2 is when this is not the case, that is, when the microstates of the “temperature in gases” 
and “temperature in spin systems” are “completely different” or heterogeneous. In this case Flat 
Physicalism makes the following observation. When we say that “temperature in gases” and 
“temperature in spin systems” are both cases of “temperature” what happens is precisely this, 
namely, that upon interacting with either “temperature in gases” or “temperature in spin systems”, 
we enter a brain state that says, “this is a case of temperature”. The fact that in both heterogeneous 
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cases (of “temperature in gases” and “temperature in spin systems”) our brain enters the same state 
is not a result of us measuring the quantity of “temperature” in those objects, since - by assumption 
- they do not share anything the measuring of which will yield the same outcome. We just happen 
to enter the brain state saying, “this is temperature” for no reason at all - that is, for no reason about 
the “temperature in gases” and “temperature in spin systems”. It is a case of pure coincidence. We 
give the same name, if you will, to two distinct things, in a way similar to giving the same name 
to two different people: giving them the same name does not indicate that they share any property.  
 
However, even in this case there is a shared physical fact between the cases of “temperature in 
gases” and “temperature in spin systems”, and it is our brain state that says “temperature”. In other 
words, if we extend the microstate, to include - in addition to the gas or the spins system - also the 
observer, then the microstates share an aspect, namely, the state of the brain of the observer. 
Consider an alien observing a gas and a spin system: if the microstate and micro history are all that 
there is, then the alien will not see them as sharing anything, because they don’t share anything. 
This is why Option 2 is a case of apparent but not genuine multiple realization: Flat Physicalism 
opens our eyes to the fact that the seeming of multiple realization (if indeed it so seems) is a result 
of ignoring our role as physical observers that partake in the extended microstate.  
 
Of course, this latter option is highly counter-intuitive, for it means that the observer does not 
discover which things belong to the special science kind, but rather creates that kind. The things 
out there do not share anything to be discovered (since the physics is all that there is, and the things 
out there do not share anything physical) and the only thing that makes them a kind is the shared 
brain state of the observer, which just happens to be the same, by pure coincidence and for no 
reason at all - again, in a similar way that different people happen to have the same name. But we 
must allow for this option, which may explain some contingencies of human history. 
 
Option 3? Supporters of genuine multiple realization claim that neither Option 1 nor Option 2 
obtain, and nevertheless aliens will sense that “temperature in gases” and “temperature in spin 
systems” are of the same kind, “temperature”. How can this case be explained? Flat Physicalism 
will then have to admit that the physical facts are not everything that there is: there are non-physical 
facts as well, and those are the facts that the alien can sense, and in virtue of which it will discover 
empirically that “temperature in gases” and “temperature in spin systems” are of the same kind, 
“temperature”. This is token dualism. Flat Physicalism will, in this case, fail and turn out to be 
false. And so, the claim of our Flat Physicalism approach is that the name “non-reductive 
physicalism” is a misnomer: an approach that allows for genuine multiple realization is not 
physicalism at all, but is an approach of token dualism.19  
 
19 By the way, we propose here that Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiment, in which two 
substances, XYZ and H2O, bring about in the observer the same experience, should be analyzed along 
these lines, and similarly Kripke’s (1980) “theoretical identifications” such as “water is H2O” (see Hoefer 
and Marti 2019). Importantly, water is not a mere “Lego”-like composition of particles (see Chang 2012, 
22 
 
Another way to see this is the following. If, as Flat Physicalism conjectures, the facts of 
fundamental physics are everything that there is, then by looking at the token microstate or micro 
history one is (ideally) able to know everything. In particular, one is (in principle) able to know, 
given the microstate, to which high-level kinds a system belongs. By contrast, if multiple 
realizability obtains, this is not possible, since the very fact that certain heterogeneous physical 
kinds (but not others) all under the same special-science kind, is not derivable from the 
fundamental physical facts. This partition needs to be given top-down, that is, from some source 
that is not part of the physics of the system or of the world. Importantly, even if supervenience 
obtains, unless one receives information “from above” concerning which physical kinds are 
subsumed under which high-level kind, this information is not, and cannot be, available by looking 
at the system of interest. This is clear token dualism.  
 
For these reasons, Flat Physicalism is the conjecture that the hypothesis of multiple realizability is 
false. The special sciences kinds and regularities are those of fundamental physics: this is a 
reductive type-identity physicalist view. 
 
2.6 Mental kinds 
We said that Flat Physicalism can account for all the cases of apparent, non-genuine multiple 
realization in the special sciences such as biology or geology, by appealing to the observer and 
extending the microstate to include it (Option 2 above). But this line of explanation does not apply 
for the science of psychology. The reason is this. (And the reason has nothing to do with the so-
called “hard problem of consciousness” and notions like subjectivity, qualia, etc. The problem is 
totally different, and is the following.)  
 
It is often said in contemporary literature that psychological kinds (e.g., pain) are realized by 
different creatures, e.g.: by different human brains, and ipso facto by non-human brains, a famous 
example being Putnam’s (1975) octopus pain. Let us assume here, for the sake of the argument 
and without arguing for or against it, that indeed octopuses and human beings share something 
about their mentality (not only about their behavior!), and that the shared thing is that they are both 
“in pain”. A point that we find important is this: admittedly there are different kinds of pain; we 
know this to be the case in humans, and ipso facto it is the case with respect to non-human animals; 
 
2015): the interactions responsible for the existence of each molecule and for their combination to form 
water are described by the theories of fundamental physics, and form part and parcel of the aspects of the 
fundamental physical state of affairs that we call “water”; there is no residue that calls for explanation in 
terms of other metaphysical relations like grounding, determination, realization, etc. 
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still, the assumption here is that all these different cases share the fact of being “in pain” and not 
something else. How can this (assumed) fact be explained? 
 
Option 1 (of Sec. 2.5 above) is type-type identity reductionism, according to which all the cases 
of pain are (identical with) shared aspects (macrovariables) of the microstate of the creature that 
feels pain, be it a human being or an octopus or an alien. The shared aspect is exactly the same, it 
is reproduced precisely in all the cases in which there is pain (as Putnam 1975 realized from the 
start). This is the Flat Physicalist account of the mental. Friends of multiple realization of the 
mental by the physical acknowledge that Option 1 is coherent, but think it is unreasonable (famous 
examples are Putnam 1975 and Fodor 1974).  
 
Friends of multiple realizability, i.e., of non-reductive physicalism, reject Option 1, insisting that 
whatever human pain and octopus pain share is not an aspect of their microstate, that is, these cases 
are genuinely physically heterogeneous. They need to opt for either Option 2 or Option 3 (of Sec. 
2.5 above) 
 
According to Option 2 it should be possible to account for this case by introducing an observer 
that, when any of the heterogeneous cases takes place, is in the brain state in which it “believes 
that this creature is in pain”. But this option raises two problems.  
(1) It starts an infinite regress, since the question re-arises concerning the belief of the observer. 
(2) It can’t work since the octopus and the human being feel - directly and intrinsically - that they 
are in pain, so that this pain must be about them, rather than about the observer.20  
So Option 2 is not open to friends of multiple realizability of mental kinds by physical kinds. 
 
We are left with Option 3: since the creatures that are said to share the feeling of pain do not share 
a physical fact, they share a non-physical fact, a non-physical feature that obtains in each and every 
token of “being in pain”. This is token dualism. “Non-reductive physicalism” is a misnomer: an 
approach that allows for genuine multiple realization is not physicalism at all, but is token 
dualism.21  
 
20 Some thinkers deny that first person reports are good evidence concerning the mental realm. We set 
aside this issue; see Shenker 2020b for references and discussion. 
21 By the way, we propose here that Putnam’s famous Twin Earth thought experiment, in which two 
substances, XYZ and H2O, causally bring about in the observer the same experience, should be analyzed 
along these lines, and similarly Kripke’s (1980) “theoretical identifications” such as “water is H2O” (see 
Hoefer and Marti 2019). Importantly, water is not a mere “Lego”-like composition of particles (see Chang 
2012, 2015): the interactions responsible for the existence of each molecule and for their combination to 
form water are described by the theories of fundamental physics, and form part and parcel of the aspects 
of the fundamental physical state of affairs that we call “water”; there is no residue that calls for 




3. The metaphysical framework: The Mentaculus and 
the Humean base 
Having presented The Mentaculus (in Sec. 1) and Flat Physicalism (in Sec. 2) we now return to 
examine The Mentaculus in some more detail, comparing it with Flat Physicalism. Albert and 
Loewer work in the framework of a version of a Lewis-style metaphysics concerning laws and 
chance (see e.g., Albert 2014 pp. 23-24, Loewer 2020a, and especially Loewer’s recent “package 
deal” version in his 2020b). This framework guides the construction of The Mentaculus and 
explains some of its features. In this section we explore this metaphysical framework. 
 
David Lewis is often seen as one of the most important reductionist philosophers (see for example 
Weatherson 2016). But it is not clear whether he endorsed metaphysical reductionism in a 
straightforward way. Hall (2020) writes:  
 
“What he in fact recommends is a holistic approach: we start with the total body of claims 
we are inclined to believe - whether on the basis of “common sense” (an oft-invoked 
category, for Lewis) or of science - and try our best to systematize it in accordance with 
standards of theoretical goodness that are themselves endorsed by common sense and/or 
science (and so are themselves, to some extent, also up for grabs). … Here is an especially 
succinct description of this approach: “One comes to philosophy already endowed with a 
stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these 
preexisting opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding 
them into an orderly system.” (Lewis 1973, p. 88). Still, while Lewis's method of 
philosophical inquiry is certainly not “bottom-up”, in my opinion it is best to present the 
results of that inquiry in a bottom-up fashion.” (Hall 2020).  
 
And this is the line we shall pursue. To the extent that such a bottom-up description recovers 
Lewis’s main results we would see it as (for all practical purposes) reductionist. It seems to us that 
Loewer’s (2020b) PDA is in line with the holistic spirit that Hall ascribes to Lewis. We shall 
interpret Loewer’s approach and examine its reductive nature along the same lines.  
 
Generally speaking, Lewis’s metaphysics can be described as consisting of four main elements, 
which we describe by bringing four quotations from Lewis (marked (i), (ii), (iii) in Sec. 3 and (iv) 
in Sec. 4).  
 
(i) “Humean supervenience is named in honor of the great denier of necessary connections. 
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular 
fact, just one little thing and then another. (But it is no part of the thesis that these local 
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matters are mental.) We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal 
distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter 
or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly 
natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be 
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all.” (Lewis 1986, 
pp. ix-x) 
 
Lewis’s “vast mosaic”, which is “all there is to the world”, is often called the “Humean base”. 
Loewer’s (2020b) PDA introduces substantial amendments to Lewis’s conception of the Humean 
base: both to what the Humean base is, and to how we can know it. In Lewis’s approach the 
properties of the elements of the Humean base are categorical, and their distribution among the 
elements is contingent. This contingency is what makes it “Humean”. Loewer writes: 
   
“Most contemporary Humeans … agree with Hume that fundamental necessary 
connections between distinct entities are metaphysically and epistemologically mysterious 
and not required by an account of the metaphysics of laws found in science.” (Loewer 
2020b) 
 
In Lewis’s Humean base nothing is necessary about the distribution of the qualities; they just 
happen to be the way that they are. Several questions arise: What determines the elements of the 
Humean base? What are they? And how can we know them? We examine Lewis’s view on this 
and Loewer’s (2020b) PDA. 
 
First question. In Lewis’s account, the qualities of the elements of the Humean base are categorical: 
brute, unexplained and unexplainable facts. In a sense, nothing “determines” them; they are what 
they are, and that’s the end of it. In particular, they are not defined by any laws governing them: 
the fact that there are no such laws is, as we said, a key feature of Lewis’s Humean base. It is 
precisely this nature of these qualities that provides Lewis with the possibility of making their 
distribution completely contingent. But categorical qualities (“quiddities”) are considered by 
many, Loewer (2020b) included, as metaphysically problematic (see e.g. Maudlin 2007b). To 
avoid them and provide some justification for the postulation of certain qualities rather than others, 
Loewer (2020b) opts for properties that are characterized under laws. He writes: 
 
“The PDA is a descendant and I believe improvement over Lewis’ [best system approach]. 
Like Lewis’ Humean [best system approach] it rejects governing laws and law determining 
powers. But unlike Lewis’ [best system approach] its account follows more closely the 
aims of physics and the criteria physicists appeal to in order to achieve them than a priori 
metaphysics. By rejecting Lewis’ reliance on metaphysically given perfectly natural 
properties while maintaining the basic idea of his [best system approach] the PDA results 
26 
in an account of laws and fundamental properties that is friendlier to contemporary 
physics.” (Loewer 2020b) 
 
Loewer acknowledges that this introduces into the Humean base an element of necessity - the very 
thing that Lewis tried to avoid. But Loewer thinks that this kind of necessity is compatible with 
the main aims, gist, and principles of a Lewis-style metaphysics. The reason might be that the 
properties and the laws are parts of the same “package deal”, in which the parts impose constraints 
on one another, but as a whole the package is contingent.  
 
Next questions: What are Lewis’s categorical qualities? And how can we know them? For Loewer 
(2020b), contemporary physics provides a key for discovering the nature of the Humean base, in 
line with Lewis’s following words. 
 
(ii) “It is a task of physics to provide an inventory of all the fundamental properties and 
relations that occur in the world...We have no a priori guarantee of it. but we may 
reasonably think that present-day physics goes a long way toward a complete and correct 
inventory… And we may reasonably hope that future physics can finish the job in the same 
distinctive style. We may think, for instance, that mass and charge are among the 
fundamental properties... we may provisionally accept that all fundamental properties and 
relations that actually occur are physical. This is the thesis of materialism.” (Lewis 1994, 
p. 412-13) 
 
Notice that for Lewis “the thesis of materialism” is subtly different from what is often taken to be 
the thesis of physicalism (or of materialism standardly understood). According to physicalism, the 
world is fundamentally physical, and there is nothing over and above whatever physics describes. 
According to Lewis, by contrast, the world is fundamentally the Humean base, and physics - which 
is (part of) the “best system” (a notion discussed in a moment) - is a theory that provides some 
information about it, that enables useful predictions about the phenomena. We write that physics 
is “part of” the “best system” (and not the “best system” simpliciter) because on the approach of 
Lewis as well as of Loewer and Albert the best system may include additional elements, as we 
discuss below and in the next section.  
 
Why is physics the key to discovering the properties of the Humean base elements, in Lewis’s 
approach? The answer is that physics is (part of) the “best system” with respect to the Humean 
base; Lewis writes: 
 
(iii) “Laws of nature, whatever else they may be, are at least exceptionless regularities. Not 
all regularities are laws, of course. But, following the lead of… Ramsey, I suggest that the 
laws are the ones that buy into those systems of truths that achieve an unexcelled 




Albert and Loewer endorse the general Lewisian framework for understanding laws of nature as 
“best systems”. Albert explains this idea thus: 
 
“You get to have an audience with God. And God promises to tell you whatever you’d like 
to know. And you ask Him to tell you about the world. And He begins to recite the facts: 
… you explain to God that you’re actually a bit pressed for time, … And you ask if maybe 
there’s something … that will serve you well, or reasonably well, or as well as possible, in 
making your way about in the world. And what it is to be a law, and all it is to be a law, on 
this picture of Hume’s and Lewis’s and Loewer’s, is to be an element of the best possible 
response to precisely this request - to be a member (that is) of that set of true propositions 
about the world which, alone among all of the sets of true propositions about the world that 
can be put together, best combines simplicity and informativeness.”22 (Albert 2014, pp. 23-
24) 
 
As Loewer (2020b) emphasizes, in order to quantify the degree of simplicity and informativeness 
in describing the distribution of the properties among the elements of the Humean base, we need 
to know which those properties are. For Lewis, those are “perfectly natural” categorical properties; 
but which are they?  
 
The “best system” is a theory that bears a particular kind of relation to the Humean base: it is (or 
contains) the set of true propositions about the Humean base, and this means that if the best system 
is physics (i.e. assuming that physics contains true statements about the Humean base) then the 
Humean base has to be amenable to such a partial description by physics, and this provides some 
constraints, and thereby some information, about the nature of the Humean base. As we saw in 
quotations (i) and (ii) from Lewis tries to make his Humean base amenable to a description by 
classical physics. But why constrain the Humean base to fit classical physics which is not our best 
physical theory? Lewis would say that classical physics may give wrong predictions, but (a) some 
of its fundamental ideas (such as the idea of point-like particles) may be still true; and (b) there are 
good reasons to think that quantum mechanics in its present form is fundamentally flawed, so we 
can't take lessons from it about the base, either. Loewer disagrees: for all the reasons for accepting 
contemporary physics as the best available theory, he wants a Humean base that will be amenable 
to a description by our best contemporary theories. Therefore, he proposes that the properties of 
the elements of the Humean base should be those that appear in the laws of contemporary physics 
(but perhaps not exclusively; see Sec. 4 below on the special sciences). 
 
Damerest expresses the following worry concerning Loewer’s approach:  
 
 
22 Here we take these latter properties to have objective meanings, so that there is a matter of fact 
concerning their degree in each “set of true propositions”. See on this Weatherson (2016).  
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“For the Lewisian Humean, the actual world is made up of a spacetime with perfectly 
natural properties distributed throughout, and it is this distribution that we systematize with 
our logical law-statements. However, on Loewer’s account, there are no perfectly natural 
properties—or if there are, they may well be irrelevant to scientific theorizing. So, there is 
the question of what the world is made up of, fundamentally. What is meant to stand in for 
the ‘Humean mosaic’ that other Humeans are happy to posit? What, exactly, do our best 
logical law-statements - formulated in terms of useful predicates - actually systematize?” 
(Demarest 2019 p.393)  
 
Loewer’s response to Demarest is this: 
 
“The PDA accomplishes this trick [by requiring] that the optimal package enables 
accounting for the macroscopic in terms of the microscopic. While macroscopic entities 
and properties are not fundamental, one of the main aims of physics is to account for 
macroscopic truths in terms of fundamental properties and laws. This requirement helps 
nail down the optimal.” (Loewer 2020b) 
 
(We are not sure what is meant here: perhaps Loewer alludes to an “account” by multiple 
realization of the properties and laws of the special sciences (sciences that are “not fundamental”,  
perhaps those are the “macroscopic”) by the properties and laws of physics (which is 
“fundamental”, perhaps this is the “microscopic”). We explained the notions of “microscopic” and 
of microstates and macrostates in physics in Sec. 2 above; in Sec. 4 we discuss the special 
sciences.)  
 
Lewis’s idea (in quotations (i) and (ii) above) was that in order for physics to be able to say 
something significant about the categorical qualities of the elements in the Humean base, those 
qualities must appear (at least partly) in physics, and hence from physics we can learn something 
about the Humean base. Those are the statements of physics that are the “set of true propositions 
about the world” (Albert 2014, p. 24).  
 
Which “physics” are we talking about? Suppose, with Loewer and Albert, that physics is The 
Mentaculus: 
 
“My proposal is that The Mentaculus (with the correct dynamical laws) is the best system 
for our world.” (Loewer 2020a). 
 
(We may assume that here the NM and CF are placeholders for contemporary physics, for 
example: they might be some suitable version of quantum mechanics; and PH and SP are 
placeholders for suitable auxiliary hypotheses.) In order to understand the relations between The 
Mentaculus and the Humean base it is useful to consider to what extent they overlap. 
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Are there elements of The Mentaculus that are not in the Humean base?  
 
Loewer (1997) says that there are: 
 
“[Humean Supervenience] doesn't entail physicalism since it is compatible with there being 
Humean properties that are not physical. Physicalism doesn't entail [Humean 
Supervenience] since there is no guarantee that the fundamental properties posited by 
physics are intrinsic properties of spatio-temporal locations. In fact, it seems pretty clear 
that contemporary physics does dream of non-Humean properties.” (Loewer 1996, p. 103-
4) 
 
Here is an example of an element of The Mentaculus that is not in the Lewisian (not PDA!) 
Humean base. In NM - which is part of The Mentaculus - there are velocities (and other time 
derivatives), and since these entail that the time slices are not independent of each other, as Albert 
(2000, Ch. 1) emphasizes, the instantaneous velocities, which play an important role in NM, are 
not elements of the Humean base.  
  
Of course, the fact that there are elements of The Mentaculus that are not part of the Humean base, 
is by itself not a problem in a Lewisian framework, as long as they are conducive to the overall 
“best system” balance between simplicity and informativeness about the world, that is, about the 
Humean base.  
 
On the other hand, this raises the following problem: How do we know that (or whether) velocities, 
for example, are not in the Humean base? We know that if we are sure that the elements of the 
Humean base are independent. But how do we know that? For Lewis some criterion for this is 
provided by the motivation for coming up with the whole Humean framework, namely, eschewing 
the notion of necessity from the fundamental metaphysics. (We address Loewer’s PDA in a 
moment.) But while this Lewisian motivation may help with respect to deciding whether or not 
velocities are in the Humean base, it is less helpful in other cases. Here is an example. Consider 
an “upgraded” version of The Mentaculus in which NM is a placeholder for some version of 
quantum mechanics in which the quantum state is interpreted realistically. This requires a non-
trivial alteration of Lewis’s description of the Humean base.  Loewer writes:  
 
“The lesson for a defender of [Humean supervenience] to take from quantum mechanics is 
to count a property as Humean in a world iff it is an intrinsic quality of points in the 
fundamental space of that world. If Bohm's theory (or any other version of QM that 
construes the wave function realistically) is correct then that space is configuration space. 
Given this account of Humean properties quantum non-locality poses no threat to [Humean 
supervenience].” (Loewer 1996, p. 104) 
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But this lesson is controversial. For example, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi (1992) argue that the 
wavefunction in Bohmian Mechanics is not a physical state of anything, but rather a law defining 
the motion of particles, since it is defined over the high-dimensional 3N-configuration space, 
which they take to be a state space (of all possible Bohmian positions), not the real physical space. 
Albert (2014) criticizes this view arguing that the wavefunction in the 3N space is (in John Bell’s 
words) “a physically real field, as real here as Maxwell’s fields were for Maxwell.” (Albert 2014, 
p. 126, quoting Bell 1982). This idea, however, violates features of the space of elementary events 
proposed by Lewis.  
 
So, there are elements in The Mentaculus that are not in the Humean base: in order to provide the 
“best” system that balances informativeness and simplicity, The Mentaculus includes a partial 
description of the Humean base as well as additional elements. But does a “best system” have to 
be like that? Couldn’t there be a “best system” that consists only of a partial description of the 
Humean base with no additional elements? As the Humean base becomes closer to physics (and 
vice versa) the whole metaphysical framework becomes closer to physicalism, as for example in 
Flat Physicalism. Will the in-principle difference between these metaphysical frameworks cease 
to be interesting at some point? We leave this question open.  
 
Are there elements of the Humean base that are not in physics? 
 
Trivially there are elements of the Humean base that are not in physics, since if physics is to be a 
“best system” that balances simplicity and informativeness, it will in general not provide the full 
information about the Humean base (as is made clear in Albert’s parable above).  
 
But more generally, are there elements of the Humean base that cannot (in principle) be accounted 
for by physics? To answer this question, it is important to distinguish between two approaches to 
the term “physics”:  
 
(1) “Physics” is the entire Mentaculus, where CF+NM may be placeholders for contemporary 
physics, and PH and SP may be placeholders for suitable auxiliary hypotheses. PH and SP are 
included in The Mentaculus since it is assumed that they cannot be deduced from CF+NM. So 
here, the corresponding elements of the Humean base can be deduced from “physics” qua The 
Mentaculus, but not from “physics” qua CF+NM. 
 
(2) “Physics” is only CF+NM, where again those are placeholders for contemporary physics, and 
PH and SP (or the statements for which they are placeholders, if they are true,) are derived from 
CF+NM. Flat Physicalism is a theory of this structure (as we saw in Sec. 2.3 and 2.4). 
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In each of these two cases the question of whether there are elements in the Humean base that are 
not in physics may be different.  
 
In Lewis-style metaphysics, “physics” is (part of) the “best system”, and therefore the question of 
which of option (1) or (2) is “physics” depends on the question which of them is at least “better”, 
if not the “best”. If there is a theory of kind (2) which provides the same degree of informativeness 
with respect to the Humean base as The Mentaculus does, then it is “better”, at least in the sense 
of “best system”, than The Mentaculus which is a theory of kind (1). It seems to us that both Albert 
and Loewer accept this idea for which theory would be “better”. For example, Albert (2000, Ch. 
7; 2014, Ch. 1) argued that his “GRW Mentaculus”, in which NM is replaced with the collapse 
theory by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986; see also Bell 1987), is better than the classical 
Mentaculus (or any other quantum theory), since given a certain hypothesis he introduced about 
the GRW dynamics, the Second Law probabilities are reduced to the Born probabilities, without 
assuming any probability distribution over quantum states. The GRW Mentaculus is better 
presumably because it gets closer to a kind (2) theory.     
 
Flat Physicalism is a theory of kind (2): as we saw in Section 2 it assumes only CF+NM (seen as 
placeholders for our best fundamental theory of physics) and it accounts for PH, for SP, for the 
notion of objective chance in a deterministic universe, and for the special sciences including 
psychology, all on the basis of CF+NM. Relative to Flat Physicalism, The Mentaculus is not the 
“best system”.  
4. The Mentaculus and the special sciences 
In the previous section we addressed the relation of “best system” between The Mentaculus and 
the Humean base. This is not a reductive relation, in any of the directions, and moreover we 
expressed the view that The Mentaculus is not the “best system” of the Humean base, and that 
there is a “better” one: Flat Physicalism. In this section we set this relation aside and turn to another 
question concerning The Mentaculus: suppose that we take The Mentaculus to be our “physics” 
(type (1) theory in the terms just discussed in Sec. 3). Given this assumption, according to the 
metaphysical framework endorsed by either Lewis or Albert and Loewer, do all the phenomena 
and facts in the universe, and in particular those described by the special sciences, reduce to - or 
are otherwise accounted by - The Mentaculus? In this sense: Is everything “physical”?  
 
Albert writes on this matter: 
 
“... the special sciences must all, in some principled sense, be deducible from the 
fundamental laws of physics.” (Albert 2014, p. 10) 
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Let us clarify (a) what these “fundamental laws of physics” are, and then (b) what those “special 
sciences” are, and are they indeed “deducible” from the former in the account of Loewer and 
Albert. 
 
(a) The fundamental laws are, for Albert and Loewer, The Mentaculus (i.e., all of its elements, not 
only CF+NM): 
  
“If anything along the lines of the picture we are trying to imagine here should turn out to 
be true, then any correct special-scientific explanation whatsoever can in principle be 
uncovered, can in principle be descried, in the fundamental physical theory of the world, 
by the following procedure. Start with The Mentaculus. Conditionalize The Mentaculus on 
whatever particular features of the world play a role in the special-scientific explanation in 
question - conditionalize The Mentaculus (that is) on whatever particular features of the 
world appear either explicitly or implicitly among the explanantia of the special-scientific 
explanation in question. And check to see whether or not the resultant probability 
distribution - the conditionalized probability distribution, makes the explanandum likely. If 
it does, then we have recovered the special-scientific explanation from the fundamental 
physical theory - and if it doesn’t, then either the fundamental theory, or the special-
scientific explanation, or both, are wrong.” (Albert 2014, p. 17) 
 
(By the way, Albert endorses here the idea that showing that a certain fact is likely explains why 
this fact obtains. If (as we believe) the SP of The Mentaculus involves assuming a probability 
measure just because it makes the actual facts likely, then the SP cannot explain why those actual 
facts obtain. This point is crucial with respect to some of the typicality arguments, see Hemmo and 
Shenker 2012, 2015b; we do not expand on this issue here.) 
 
(b) What does The Mentaculus explain? What are the special sciences and how are they explained 
by The Mentaculus? It seems to us (we are not sure) that on this matter, in particular with respect 
to multiple realization, Loewer’s and Albert’s views may differ, and therefore we address their 
views separately.  
4.1 Loewer’s view 
Loewer says that The Mentaculus is “arguably a complete scientific theory of the universe” 
(Loewer 2020a p.6), but then he adds: 
    
“The Mentaculus provides an account not only of the laws of thermodynamics, but also an 




Importantly, for Loewer The Mentaculus is sufficient to account for the laws of thermodynamics, 
but not for “other special sciences”: there, it is only an ingredient in the account. Why is that so? 
 
We suspect that the reason for this is that Loewer accepts that the special sciences are not deducible 
from The Mentaculus, because on his view special sciences properties are multiply realizable by 
physical properties. In earlier writings Loewer (2008) endorsed multiple realizability explicitly. 
He expressed the “physicalism” element in “non-reductive physicalism” thus:  
     
“Question: ‘‘Why is there anything except physics?’’ Answer: ‘‘Because there is 
physics!’” (Loewer 2008, p. 162)  
 
And expressed the “non-reductive” element in “non-reductive physicalism” thus:  
     
“It is true that the account of special sciences I have described … isn’t reductionist in some 
other ways. It doesn’t entail that special science properties are identical to properties of 
fundamental physics and it allows for the multiple realizability, temporal asymmetry and 
so on of special science laws.” (Loewer 2008, p. 162)  
 
In this Loewer followed the footsteps of Lewis:  
 
(iv) “My reductionism about the mind begins as part of an a priori reductionism about 
everything… the very same fundamental properties and relations, governed by the very 
same laws occur in the living and the dead parts of the world, and in the sentient and the 
insentient parts, and in the clever and the stupid parts. … When we describe mental state 
M as the occupant of the M-role,... [i]t says nothing about what sort of state it is that 
occupies the role. It might be a non-physical or a physical state, and if it is physical it might 
be a state of neural activity in the brain, or a pattern of currents and charges on a silicon 
chip, or the jangling of an enormous assemblage of beer cans.” (Lewis 1994, p. 412-3, 418; 
see also Lewis 1966, 1980a) 
 
In Sections 2.5 and 2.6 above, when we discussed the Flat Physicalist account of the special 
sciences, we showed that allowing for multiple realizability amounts to endorsing token dualism, 
that is, endorsing the view according to which not everything is physical, and in the present 
context, that not everything is deducible from The Mentaculus. To the extent that Loewer accepts 
the multiple realizability thesis, he endorses a dualist metaphysics, in which indeed The 
Mentaculus is at best an ingredient in accounting for the special sciences. While Lewis 
acknowledges that both supervenience and multiple-realizability are not a priori requirements, he 
takes them to hold as a matter of fact in our world, and in this sense, Lewis endorses a dualist 
metaphysics, whatever his “physics” is and whatever his account of the Humean base is. 
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Notice that the “non-physical” facts, that must be assumed as part of the multiple realizability 
thesis, need not be supernatural facts; they are merely non-physical ones, that is - in our context - 
not in The Mentaculus. Whether the “best system” laws, that optimally balance informativeness 
and simplicity with respect to the Humean base, turn out to describe a world that is unified in being 
reducible to “physics”, or turn out to be some patchwork, is a question of fact. Presumably, 
however, if a theory according to which everything is “physical”, and a theory according to which 
some things are “physical” and some are not, provide comparable informativeness, we conjecture 
that the wholly physical one will be “better”, in the sense of “best system”. In this sense it seems 
to us that Flat Physicalism is “better” than The Mentaculus á la Loewer, due to its account of the 
special sciences.  
 
Notice that for Loewer, in the above quotation, The Mentaculus does provide a full account of 
thermodynamics, unlike the “other” special sciences (he takes thermodynamics to be a special 
science, albeit with a special status). The reason might be that all the facts that are needed to 
account for thermodynamics, have been inserted by hand into The Mentaculus: this is why it 
includes PH and SP in addition to NM and CF. We are not sure why thermodynamics merits this 
special treatment: Why insert into The Mentaculus only the facts that explain the special science 
of thermodynamics, and not the facts that explain the other special sciences? In Flat Physicalism, 
at any rate, all the special sciences are on a par and are given the same analysis and the same 
explanation. 
 
Why does Loewer require supervenience of the special sciences kinds on the physical kinds, in his 
“best system”? In the literature it is often said that supervenience expresses the primacy of physics, 
that many accept (e.g. Kim 2012; Davidson 1993), but in the “best system” approach this criterion 
is secondary, or even irrelevant: the sole criterion for being a system of laws of nature is whether 
or not the system is “best” in providing the optimal balance between informativeness and 
simplicity. Whether requiring supervenience while allowing for multiple realization is “best” in 
this sense we are not sure. Our Flat Physicalism, at any rate, requires supervenience as part of its 
reductive physicalist principle, and because of the primacy it gives to physics, and its commitment 
to there being nothing over and above the physical, it rejects the multiple realizability thesis.  
 
In sum, the situation for Loewer seems to be this. CF+NM cannot account for any of the special 
sciences. To account for thermodynamics, you need to add the extra facts (auxiliary hypotheses) 
of PH and SP. Those are declared to be part of The Mentaculus. But because of multiple realization 
to account for other special sciences one needs additional extra facts, and those are not made part 
of The Mentaculus. We are not sure why this distinction between thermodynamics and the other 
special sciences is made in Loewer’s approach. In Flat Physicalism (see Secs. 2.3-2.6) all the 
special sciences are on a par, and all are derivable from CF+NM.     
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4.2 Albert’s view 
Albert, unlike Loewer, thinks that “something’s funny” about the idea of multiple realizability. He 
brings two arguments by way of examples; let’s analyze them briefly, by comparison with Flat 
Physicalism. 
 
As we saw (in Sec. 2.5 and 2.6) Flat Physicalism identifies special sciences properties with aspects 
(macrovariables) of microstates, stressing that at each moment everything that exists, and therefore 
everything we observe, is the actual particular microstate (or the actual particular sequence of 
microstates), and with it of course its aspects. This is the ontology. Epistemologically, if everything 
that we know about the actual microstate is one of its aspects, and we remain ignorant about the 
rest of the aspects, then we cannot distinguish between the actual microstate and a continuous 
infinity of counterfactual microstates that have the same aspect, and the set of these 
indistinguishable microstates, all but one of which are counterfactual, is the macrostate. This set 
is a theoretical construct and is not “out there in the world”.  
 
By contrast, Albert (2014) identifies features of the world that are described by the special 
sciences, with sets of microstates. He writes: 
 
“Those explanantia [i.e., the features of the world] are initially going to be given to us in 
the language of one or another of the special sciences. And so, in order to carry out the sort 
of conditionalization [i.e., the account in terms of The Mentaculus] we have in mind here, 
we are going to need to know which of those special-scientific explanantia correspond to 
which regions of the space of possible exact physical microconditions of the world. And 
those correspondences can be worked out - not perfectly (mind you), but to any degree of 
accuracy and reliability we like - by means of the super-duper computational techniques 
alluded to in Section (i).” (Albert 2014 p. 17 footnote 4; our emphasis) 
 
(The “super-duper computation” is akin to Laplace’s Demon.) Note that Albert’s identification of 
special science magnitudes with sets of microstates (that occupy state space regions) is unclear 
and somewhat ambiguous. Supporters of multiple realization agree that by following the equation 
of motion for each initial state the super-duper computer can work out which “special science 
explanantia” correspond to which phase space regions of possible microstates. But what they reject 
is that the super-duper computer will find a single macrovariable (not disjunctive!) that is shared 
by the microstates in all those regions corresponding to the same special science kind (that figures 
in the “explanantia”). Obviously, if there is such a type-type-mapping between macrovariables and 
special sciences kinds, the super-duper computer will find it, and then the multiple-realization 
thesis will break down. With this point in mind, let us now proceed to examine Albert’s argument 
against the multiple realizability thesis. 
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To illustrate his objection to the thesis of multiple realizability Albert describes the following 
example concerning the “science of epidemiology”:  
 
“There are … physical systems in the world ... which are capable of distinguishing, in a 
more or less reliable way, under more or less normal circumstances, between those possible 
fundamental physical situations of the universe in which there is (say) a flu going around, 
and those in which there isn’t. And so there must be a fully explicit and fully mechanical 
technique for coordinating epidemiological situations with their fundamental physical 
equivalents - or (at any rate) for doing so in a more or less reliable way, under more or less 
normal circumstances - because there are (after all) mechanical devices around, right now, 
that can actually, literally, get it done.” (Albert 2014, p. 10) 
 
To understand this argument, we need to recall that when discussing the Flat Physicalist account 
of the special sciences we distinguished between three options. Applied to the flu example, Option 
1 says that several cases are all of the kind “flu” because there is an aspect shared by the microstates 
of the observed systems “out there”, and it is this aspect that is (identical with) flu. The 
epidemiologist interacts with this aspect in each and every one of the cases, and thereby comes to 
have the brain state in which she believes that it is a case of flu. In Option 1 there is no multiple 
realization; it is the option of reductive type-identity physicalism.  
 
According to Option 2, by contrast, the microstates “out there” do not share any physical aspect; 
they are physically heterogeneous, and nevertheless there is a system called “the epidemiologist” 
that comes to have the brain state in which she believes that it is a case of flu. The brain state of 
the epidemiologist does not measure the systems “out there” since those do not share anything that 
will make them a kind. What makes them a kind is only the shared brain state of the epidemiologist: 
If we extend the microstates to include not only the systems “out there” but also the brain of the 
epidemiologist, then the extended systems’ microstates do have a physical aspect in common, 
namely, the brain state of the epidemiologist. Here, we stressed, the epidemiologist does not 
discover the special science kind of flu, but creates this kind. Option 2, when we consider the 
extended microstate, is also not one of multiple realization, and is also explained as a case of 
reductive type-identity physicalism. Cases of Option 2 may appear to be ones of multiple 
realization, if we ignore the epidemiologist and consider only the systems “out there”. This is 
apparent but non-genuine multiple realization.  
 
Option 3 is the case of genuine multiple realization, and this - we argued - is a case of token 
dualism.  
 
In these terms, Albert’s above example illustrates cases compatible with reductive type-identity 
physicalism, in which special sciences kinds are not multiply realized by physical kinds, and so 
this example does not give rise to an argument about (or against) multiple realization. It seems that 
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Albert mainly talks about Option 1, in which the epidemiologist detects the physical aspect that is 
shared by all the tokens in which there is a flu - this is clearly a case of reductive type identity 
physicalism. He does not point out that in Option 2 there might be an apparent but not-genuine 
multiple realization, and does not address Option 3 of genuine multiple realization. The argument 
we outlined against Option 3 (in see Sec. 2.5 and 2.6) shows that genuine multiple realization 
amounts to token dualism, and is therefore not a form of physicalism. 
 
Another argument that Albert brings against the thesis of multiple realizability concerns the law 
of conservation of energy: here “multiple realization” would mean that different quantities, in 
worlds with even radically different physical laws than our own, satisfy the same kind of regularity, 
described and explained by Noether’s theorem. Albert writes: 
      
“We know that the conservation of energy is a law of the actual world - and that is 
manifestly a substantive and interesting and altogether nontrivial claim. But outside of that, 
all we seem to know is that the principle is a law in all and only those worlds whose 
fundamental laws share this particular feature (that is, the feature of entailing the 
conservation of energy) with the actual one. All we seem to know (to put it slightly 
differently) is that the principle is a law in just those worlds in which it is a law - which is 
not to know anything, at least of an empirical kind, at all.” (Albert 2014 p. 14-15)  
 
Notice that this kind of multiple realizability is not the one envisaged by Fodor (1974, 1997), and 
addressed recently by for example Polger and Shapiro (2016), for they - as most of the 
contemporary philosophers of science and of cognitive science - seem to have in mind multiple 
realizations in our world. (Putnam 1975 may have other-worldly cases in mind as well.) Here 
Albert says that the counterfactual cases he imagines share the feature of “satisfying this law”, but 
we don’t know why they do; we don’t know which features of them make it the case that they do. 
However, if, in the end, we shall discover (theoretically, of course) which feature those 
counterfactual worlds share, in virtue of which they all satisfy the law of conservation of energy, 
then this will be a case of Option 1 above, in the following sense. This shared feature would be 
described in terms of some “super-physics”, in which all these worlds can be described. (Lacking 
such a super-physics language we are not sure how to make sense of this example.) Option 1 here 
would mean that the different worlds share a super-physical aspect.   
 
But it seems that this is not what Albert has in mind, since he writes: 
 
“[T]he conservation of energy can obviously be realized, the conservation of energy can 
obviously be underwritten, by any number of distinct sets of fundamental laws of 
physics—laws which will in many cases be radically different, in any number of other 
respects, from our own.” (Albert 2014 p. 14-15)  
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The other options are the following. If, in the end, we shall discover (theoretically, of course) that 
those counterfactual worlds do not share anything super-physical, then their shared satisfaction of 
this law (if it is describable at all!) would be a mere coincidence, and in fact they will not be 
exhibiting the same law at all: they will be satisfying different laws, with some parallel structural 
features. This might be understood as Option 1 as well, where the shared feature is the structural 
one, or it can be understood as Option 2, where the shared feature is the theoretician’s belief (i.e. 
brain state). Option 3 would mean that these counterfactual worlds do not share anything physical, 
or super-physical, or something in the theoretician’s brain. This would mean that we have super-
physical token dualism. 
 
In sum, Albert has the intuition that the thesis of multiple realization is unacceptable, but his 
discussion does not offer an argument against this thesis. We offered such an argument in Sections 
2.5 and 2.6. 
5. Conclusion 
We have argued that Flat Physicalism is a better system of our world in the Lewis-style sense of 
the term than The Mentaculus, because it is more reductive and more physicalist.  
 
In The Mentaculus, the PH+SP are not derived from the microscopic dynamics of our world given 
by CF+NM, but are added as independent laws about counterfactual worlds. In addition, The 
Mentaculus is not physicalist, if multiple realizability of any of the special sciences by 
heterogeneous facts is accepted. This holds also with respect to the relation between 
thermodynamics and fundamental physics (see the example of temperature in Sec. 2.5). As we 
mentioned, Lewis endorsed multiple realizability as part of his functionalism about the mind. This 
means that Lewis’s view is not physicalism at all, but (as we showed) token dualism. We are not 
sure what are the current positions of Albert and Loewer on this matter. 
 
By contrast, Flat Physicalism is fully reductive and physicalist. It accommodates the fact that given 
CF+NM, it is possible that PH+SP are false, but if they are true, we have shown how to account 
for the facts they describe on the basis of CF+NM alone. Likewise, Flat Physicalism 
accommodates the fact that the Second Law of thermodynamics is not a general theorem of 
mechanics. But: if it is true of our world (i.e., our micro-trajectory), as seems to be suggested by 
our experience, then this fact can be accounted for on the basis of CF+NM alone. Similarly, the 
account of all the other special sciences on the basis of CF+NM is fully reductive by Flat 
Physicalism which is a strict type-type reductive identity theory. All the special sciences kinds are 
strictly identical with physical kinds (aspects of the micro-trajectory) and there is no multiple 
realization whatsoever. We have shown (see Sec. 2.5 and 2.6; and elsewhere (see Hemmo and 
Shenker 2015a; 2019b; 2020b) that supervenience of higher-level kinds on physical kinds is not 
enough, since it is compatible with multiple realization, which in turn entails dualism. The laws 
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of the special sciences (if true) are derivable from CF+NM via the probability rule (1) in the same 
way that the Second Law is. 
  
Let us reiterate that within the Humean “best system” approach token dualism is not to be rejected 
as such: the only criterion for endorsing or rejecting dualism is whether the laws of nature turn out 
to be the “best system” in providing the optimal balance of informativeness and simplicity with 
respect to the Humean base. Still, if The Mentaculus turns out to be a token dualism view, it is of 
interest to know that this is the case.     
 
Finally, the general question of whether the “best system” of our world is fully reductive in the 
sense that it consists only of a partial description of the Humean base with no additional elements, 
and in particular whether this partial description is purely physicalist, is ultimately a question of 
fact. As the Humean base becomes closer to physics (and vice versa), the whole metaphysical 
framework becomes closer to physicalism, as for example in Flat Physicalism. Will the in-principle 
difference between these metaphysical frameworks cease to be interesting at some point? We leave 
this question open. 
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